Thursday, September 26, 2013

A630.7.4.RB_LarsonKurt, Mastering the Art of Corporate Reinvention


Michael Bonsignore, CEO of Honeywell, states that Honeywell will not be an extension of the old Honeywell or Allied Signal.

       Mr. Bonsignore acknowledged that some critical success factors, like cash flow concerns and future earnings were a result of under anticipation of the difficulty of the degree that the merger between Honeywell and Allies Signal were. He further stated that the two differing cultures and organizational methods between the two companies would be ironed out as time progressed, by creating a newer culture from the best attributes of both companies.

He says that Honeywell will compensate and reward people that look for best practices from both companies in creating a new corporate culture and punish those who do not.

Mr. Bonsignore’s statement could indirectly be construed as a threat to those who are not on board with the merger or his desire to successfully merge the two companies, and this could also become a union issue should the new company be spread across right to work states and those that are heavily unionized. I believe his sincerity is apparent, only the choice of words could have been better.

Do you predict Honeywell will be successful?

Honeywell will be successful simply because of the company’s method of open communications between its employees, customers and the general public. For example: the Bendix brake issue that plagued an extremely small percentage of the operational school busses. Mr. Bonsignore’s decision to alert the operators and recall the control units at great expense to the organization, and not wait for individual unit failures is indicative of his willingness to give back to the community. Much like his assistance with home restoration and improvement in communities that Honeywell has a presence.

What barriers do you see based on what you observed in the video?

Barriers that may affect the interoperability of the two combining companies might be as discussed in Brown (2011, pg. 178) where behavioral strategies in structural, technological, and behavioral changes could be impacted during and after the merger because of cultural, trust, unwanted diversification of the organization(s) or ineffective integrations between software, hardware and live ware with-in the organization.

What critical success factors should Honeywell consider as it crafts its organizational strategies around a new culture?

Honeywell should consider and be cognizant of remembering the past and why the two companies merged, remembering where they both came from and are now going. The new organization should be willing to accept globalization and diversification as a present day business model. This would also include accessibility by and to the customer(s) realizing their needs and what they as a customer would be willing to pay for in a service or product line. Like stated in Brown (2011, pg. 185) an OD strategy and comprehensive approach might be the manner and method in which jobs are designed and the way in which people are motivated. This would in-turn inspire trust and loyalty in both employees and customer expectations would also be satisfied.

What can you take away from this exercise to immediately use in your career?

Mr. Bonsignore’s longevity with the company and his willingness to go the distance in the successful merger between Honeywell and Allied signal are apparent. That said, it is imperative to use his attention to detail, open lines of communication, good candor and confidence in your approach to individuals internal and external to the organization are crucial to success.

Reference:

Brown, D. R. (2011). An experiential approach to organization development (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

Monday, September 16, 2013

A630.6.4.RB_LarsonKurt, 50 Reasons Not to Change/The Tribes We Lead


How do you react when you hear colleagues using some of the excuses listed in the 50 Reasons Not to Change graphic?

My reaction is and has always been that there are many reasons for not changing, but very few for not instituting change. As an example: I vote in all elections, because I want to institute change, or not institute change, either way, if I were to sit back and accomplish nothing, I have nothing to complain about when things do not fall into my favor due to my inaction.

Much like Godin discussed in The Tribes we lead, that a heretic is those who look at the status quo and decide they cannot abide by or live with the status quo condition. I like to equate a heretic, much like someone who is not part of the group think mantra of accomplishing business and is an innovator, maverick or individual willing to go the extra mile to make notice of a condition, system or situation that is unacceptable.     

Do you ever use any of these excuses yourself?

At times yes I do. Remembering that change for the sake of change can be a negative or possibly a bad thing. I have at times elected to go against the status quo, simply to avoid the contagious virus known as “group think”, and the change or avoidance of and to change because of what it is and what the group consensus decided and not based upon conjecture, fact, benefit or near or long-term outlook.

How can you overcome the thinking that creates those responses to change efforts?

If I understand the question correctly… how can I be a change agent or OD practitioner (internal or external,) in effecting positive change through convincing others that the change is noteworthy and worth the investment of their time and effort?

The best and most proved method of overcoming those forces that can inhibit change, convincing opponents to change to become allies for change can be all or a portion of the following:

Identify forces that cause resistance to change
Recognize strategies that can increase motivation to change
Diagnose forces driving and resisting organization change
Experience reactions to a change

Leading Change, Major Factors Affecting Success of Change:

Advocates of change
Degree of change
Time frame
Impact on culture
Evaluation of change

Do you agree with Seth Godin’s concept that tribes drive change?

I appreciate and can identify with Seth and how he described that leading and connecting people with ideas is the one sure method of inciting change. That said one must be cautious about the ideas the message and the messenger attempting to incite those ideas and change. I am of course referring to rhetoric, and the negative connotations that rhetoric can have utilized especially in today’s political world through deception and that of swaying people unethically also known as “empty campaign rhetoric”. Rhetoric can also have a positive side as well. Aristotle during the 4th century wrote rhetoric as a clear persuasive function, an epistemic function as a manner from which to discover what is known… and what could be known about a subject.

What can you take away from this exercise to immediately use in your career?

A renewed manner of thinking about inciting change for the better and how to approach change with the tools necessary for positive and proactive change. Like Michelle Kauffman’s pioneered architecture of the three questions of change:

Who exactly are you upsetting, because the status quo cannot be changed without upsetting someone?

Whom are you connecting; lots of people are in it and focusing upon the connections that are made.

Who are you leading, it’s that portion and not the mechanics of what you are building is what is important and where change occurs.  

References

Watkins, D. (2011, August 24). 50 reasons not to change. Prezi, DOI: www.prezi.com

Godin, S. (2009, February). Seth Godin: The tribes we lead.TED, DOI: www.ted.com

Brown, D. R. (2011). An experiential approach to organization development (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall



Wednesday, September 11, 2013

A630.5.4.RB_LarsonKurt, NASA Culture Change


Why did NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe address NASA employees to describe the plan to bring about proposed changes to NASA's culture?

According to Oberg (2003,) NASA and its independent watch dogs had failed at identifying patterns and trends that would have indicated the culture of denial even existed. Also reported by Oberg, Harold Gehman, USN (RET,) chair of the independent commission that investigated the Columbia accident, reportedly stated that most of the commission’s report could have been written prior to the disaster. This by itself would have been cause to investigate allegations (if any) prior to the Columbia accident; however, there would not have been enough collected data to substantiate an investigation.

As stated in Oberg (2003,) there is need of fundamental change, and not merely formalistic changes to the culture at NASA. There needs to be an understanding of the unpleasantness of human errors that have been made, including the real reasons, not the face saving or feel good ones as a way of turning the negatives of the past into the positives of the future.

Was he believable? Is it important whether he appeared to be believable?

In the two documents I reviewed in-place of the video, O’Keefe followed the classic dialog almost straight out of Brown (2011,) in-which large-scale efforts of change are initiated in response, in anticipation of an occurrence/incident. These changes in program structure and deployment methods are indictitave of a major alteration in an organization the size and complexity as NASA. In my opinion, it is almost as if the responses were choreographed in advance to an unknown yet anticipated incident… much like damage control after an un-anticipated situation. That said, O’Keefe did not come to NASA as an enthusiast of the space program. He was a generalist administrator whose expertise was in financial management.  There primarily to mitigate the International Space Station’s (ISS) $4.8 billion in overrun problems, rejecting destination driven goals like the Moon and Mars along the way. Hence the rational for forward thinking and damage control contingency plans, before the fact. In other words… he was as wary as he was sincere about getting the job done.   

Why did he talk about NASA values?

According to Lambert (2008,) O’Keefe declared that the day Columbia disintegrated as the worst day in his life.  Making another important decision to see that NASA was to be as open and transparent as possible to the media and public even if it were to be embarrassing… NASA was not known for its forth-coming attitude after the Challenger accident. It was perceived to have a bunker attitude, which took its toll on the agency.  

Basically values are the only thing that can be discussed across an organization that has not accomplished its due diligence in minding its internal affairs. Values is a manner in which to address something while not really discussing deep rooted problems like an organization that believes it is bulletproof or the only game in town. According to Oberg (2003,) one NASA official questioned as to repercussions and the possibility of personnel replacement as a result of an incident, commented… who would replace them if consequences or repercussions were instituted. This in itself should have been construed as a red flag with-in certain sectors of the management team.

What can you take away from this exercise to immediately use in your career?

I have stated and restated my core beliefs in academia, my profession and to my family. The first rule is to be truthful to yourself and those around you. If you are not you run the likelihood of sliding down the slippery slope of life and becoming a causality of those who would use you as a doormat or throw you under a bus… the trick is knowing the bus schedule.  As a member of society we owe it to our fellow man to also be clean in our daily interactions with individuals and our vocations, lifestyle and household. After all, do we as a person really trust the individual to preform a duty or service who is unkempt in his or her vocation, lifestyle or household?

I say these things because NASA is not the only agency that is in need of house cleaning. In the article “NASA’s culture of denial” by James Oberg, Oberg, spent 22 years at the Johnson Space Center as a Mission Control operator and an orbital designer. In the article He made several hard hitting quotes like:  “The culture can also be powerful because it is so pervasive, since it is rarely exposed to outside influences”. I can personally attest to Oberg’s sediment as even after five years with my current agency, I am still treated as an outsider (not in all cases) and have seen the undercarriage of a bus on several occasions, because it was easier to discredit the messenger and the message than to accept what is right and against the current culture of an agency. Or “How is the culture going to change when you are bringing in people that have been trained to accept and have only worked with one cultural style?” an insider e-mailed. “AND that is the cultural style that got you into trouble.” This encourages an inbred “groupthink” that is not conducive to disagreeing with what management wants.

My takeaway is that in certain circumstances, management may bring-in a select few lambs for the slaughtering, as a method of legitimizing a program that is rooted in the culture of “that’s the way we have always done it”. And nobody can fight that culture without either giving-up and drinking the kool aid, or leaving in disgust… Personally I do not like kool aid.    

References:

Oberg, J. (2003). NASA’s culture of denial. NBCNEWS.com, Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com

Lambright, H. (2008). Leadership and change at NASA: Sean O’Keefe as administrator. Public Administration Review, Retrieved from http://www.csus.edu/

Brown, D. R. (2011). An experiential approach to organization development (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall