Wednesday, September 11, 2013

A630.5.4.RB_LarsonKurt, NASA Culture Change


Why did NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe address NASA employees to describe the plan to bring about proposed changes to NASA's culture?

According to Oberg (2003,) NASA and its independent watch dogs had failed at identifying patterns and trends that would have indicated the culture of denial even existed. Also reported by Oberg, Harold Gehman, USN (RET,) chair of the independent commission that investigated the Columbia accident, reportedly stated that most of the commission’s report could have been written prior to the disaster. This by itself would have been cause to investigate allegations (if any) prior to the Columbia accident; however, there would not have been enough collected data to substantiate an investigation.

As stated in Oberg (2003,) there is need of fundamental change, and not merely formalistic changes to the culture at NASA. There needs to be an understanding of the unpleasantness of human errors that have been made, including the real reasons, not the face saving or feel good ones as a way of turning the negatives of the past into the positives of the future.

Was he believable? Is it important whether he appeared to be believable?

In the two documents I reviewed in-place of the video, O’Keefe followed the classic dialog almost straight out of Brown (2011,) in-which large-scale efforts of change are initiated in response, in anticipation of an occurrence/incident. These changes in program structure and deployment methods are indictitave of a major alteration in an organization the size and complexity as NASA. In my opinion, it is almost as if the responses were choreographed in advance to an unknown yet anticipated incident… much like damage control after an un-anticipated situation. That said, O’Keefe did not come to NASA as an enthusiast of the space program. He was a generalist administrator whose expertise was in financial management.  There primarily to mitigate the International Space Station’s (ISS) $4.8 billion in overrun problems, rejecting destination driven goals like the Moon and Mars along the way. Hence the rational for forward thinking and damage control contingency plans, before the fact. In other words… he was as wary as he was sincere about getting the job done.   

Why did he talk about NASA values?

According to Lambert (2008,) O’Keefe declared that the day Columbia disintegrated as the worst day in his life.  Making another important decision to see that NASA was to be as open and transparent as possible to the media and public even if it were to be embarrassing… NASA was not known for its forth-coming attitude after the Challenger accident. It was perceived to have a bunker attitude, which took its toll on the agency.  

Basically values are the only thing that can be discussed across an organization that has not accomplished its due diligence in minding its internal affairs. Values is a manner in which to address something while not really discussing deep rooted problems like an organization that believes it is bulletproof or the only game in town. According to Oberg (2003,) one NASA official questioned as to repercussions and the possibility of personnel replacement as a result of an incident, commented… who would replace them if consequences or repercussions were instituted. This in itself should have been construed as a red flag with-in certain sectors of the management team.

What can you take away from this exercise to immediately use in your career?

I have stated and restated my core beliefs in academia, my profession and to my family. The first rule is to be truthful to yourself and those around you. If you are not you run the likelihood of sliding down the slippery slope of life and becoming a causality of those who would use you as a doormat or throw you under a bus… the trick is knowing the bus schedule.  As a member of society we owe it to our fellow man to also be clean in our daily interactions with individuals and our vocations, lifestyle and household. After all, do we as a person really trust the individual to preform a duty or service who is unkempt in his or her vocation, lifestyle or household?

I say these things because NASA is not the only agency that is in need of house cleaning. In the article “NASA’s culture of denial” by James Oberg, Oberg, spent 22 years at the Johnson Space Center as a Mission Control operator and an orbital designer. In the article He made several hard hitting quotes like:  “The culture can also be powerful because it is so pervasive, since it is rarely exposed to outside influences”. I can personally attest to Oberg’s sediment as even after five years with my current agency, I am still treated as an outsider (not in all cases) and have seen the undercarriage of a bus on several occasions, because it was easier to discredit the messenger and the message than to accept what is right and against the current culture of an agency. Or “How is the culture going to change when you are bringing in people that have been trained to accept and have only worked with one cultural style?” an insider e-mailed. “AND that is the cultural style that got you into trouble.” This encourages an inbred “groupthink” that is not conducive to disagreeing with what management wants.

My takeaway is that in certain circumstances, management may bring-in a select few lambs for the slaughtering, as a method of legitimizing a program that is rooted in the culture of “that’s the way we have always done it”. And nobody can fight that culture without either giving-up and drinking the kool aid, or leaving in disgust… Personally I do not like kool aid.    

References:

Oberg, J. (2003). NASA’s culture of denial. NBCNEWS.com, Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com

Lambright, H. (2008). Leadership and change at NASA: Sean O’Keefe as administrator. Public Administration Review, Retrieved from http://www.csus.edu/

Brown, D. R. (2011). An experiential approach to organization development (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall

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